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i. introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil 
Rights Act) was enacted to eliminate discriminatory 
employment practices on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.1 In 1978, Congress 
elaborated on Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA), requiring that employers 
treat pregnant employees the same as employees who 
were not pregnant.2 In AT&T v. Hulteen, the Supreme 
Court ruled on whether it is permissible to penalize 
retiring women by lowering their retirement pension 
benefits for taking pregnancy-related disability leave 
before the enactment of the PDA.3
Consider this scenario: In 1976, Company H had a 
policy that distinguished disability leave based on 
whether it was pregnancy-related. Employees who 
took pregnancy-related disability leave only received 
pension benefits credit for thirty days of leave. 
Employees taking non-pregnancy-related disability 
leave received unlimited credit for their pension 
benefits.4 After the enactment of the PDA, Company 
H allowed the same credit for both pregnancy and non-
pregnancy-related disability leave. However, it refused 
to adjust its credit system for the employees who took 
pregnancy-related disability leave before the PDA.5 
Lilly, an employee of Company H, took pregnancy-
related disability leave in 1976, before the Act, and 
received smaller pension benefits than her colleagues 
who took non-pregnancy-related disability leave.6 
Under the holding of AT&T v. Hulteen, Lilly is not 
entitled to recover this discrepancy because Company 
H’s pension benefits calculation is facially neutral. The 
PDA would have to be retroactive to find this action 
discriminatory.7
Historically, discrimination against women concerning 
childbirth and pregnancy was legally sanctioned 
and resulted in fewer advantages for women in the 
workforce.8 Pregnancy was treated less favorably than 
other physical conditions that affected an employee’s 
performance in the workplace.9 Most employers 
discharged a woman as soon as she became noticeably 
pregnant, and if she returned, she was considered a 
new, rather than a returning employee.10
Before 1978, many employers would give female 
employees a maximum of thirty days of credited 
pregnancy-related disability leave, while non-pregnant 
employees would receive unlimited credit for disability 
leave.11 Laws such as Title VII and the PDA were 
enacted to protect pregnant women from this practice.12 
These laws forced many employers to change their 
policies to allow unlimited credit for pregnancy-
related disability leave.13 However, PDA women who 
took pregnancy-related disability leave prior to the 
Act, were unable to receive full credit for leave lasting 
longer than thirty days.14 Consequently, these women 
not only received smaller pension benefits, but also 
were ineligible for new early retirement programs.15
In AT&T v. Hulteen, the Supreme Court considered 
whether limiting the pregnancy-related benefits credit 
where leave was taken before the PDA, was a Title VII 
violation of the PDA.16 The Court held that employer 
AT&T did not violate Title VII when it limited pension 
benefits based on this criteria.17 The Court ruled that 
AT&T’s actions were facially neutral and qualified for 
the bona fide seniority system exception.18 To create a 
Title VII violation, the Court concluded that the PDA 
would have to apply retroactively.19
This Note argues that the reasoning in Hulteen was 
flawed because AT&T’s pension benefits calculation 
was intentionally discriminatory. Furthermore, the 
PDA does not have to be retroactive for AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation to be a Title VII violation.20 Part 
II examines the congressional intent behind the PDA, 
the tests for determining a discriminatory action under 
Title VII, and the background of Hulteen.21 Part III 
argues that AT&T’s pension benefits calculation was 
intentionally discriminatory and a current Title VII 
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violation. The Court should have given the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s position 
deference.22 Part IV proposes that, in response to 
Hulteen, Congress should amend the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act to decrease the employee’s burden of 
proof in fringe benefit discrimination claims.23 Part 
V concludes that Hulteen penalizes women that 
are protected by law for taking pregnancy-related 
disability leave and the law must be changed to provide 
relief to these women.24
ii. Background
A. The Civil Rights Act’s Protection of Pregnant Women 
in the Workplace and the Supreme Court’s Deference to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The Civil Rights Act requires employers to provide 
equal opportunities to all employees.25 Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act prohibits discriminatory employment 
practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin.26 To meet this end, Title VII created 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and delegated to it the primary responsibility 
of preventing and eliminating unlawful employment 
practices.27 Employment discrimination based on 
pregnancy continued after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act. In 1973, the EEOC responded by developing 
guidelines that prohibited employment policies that 
discriminated against pregnant employees.28
The Supreme Court has given deference to the EEOC 
interpretation guidelines. The Court gives deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, if 
the agency has the authority to promulgate rules on that 
statute.29 Congress gave the EEOC the power to issue 
regulations on Title VII and provided in Section 713(b) 
of Title VII that a reliance on the EEOC interpretations 
would absolve an employer from liability.30 The Court 
gave the EEOC guidelines “great deference” in Phillips 
v. Martin Marietta Corp. because the EEOC was 
charged with administering Title VII.31 The Supreme 
Court also gave the EEOC guidelines “great deference” 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., because the Civil Rights 
Act itself and the legislative history supported the 
EEOC interpretation.32 The Court has given the EEOC 
interpretations great deference, because the EEOC has 
been given authority by Congress to administer the 
principles of Title VII.33
B. The Development of the PDA
Congress enacted the PDA in response to General 
Electric Company v. Gilbert, where the Court held that 
the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a 
company’s comprehensive disability program did not 
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.34 Congress 
elaborated on the purpose of Title VII by enacting 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that prohibited 
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or any 
related medical conditions.35 Congress disagreed with 
the Gilbert decision and concluded that the company’s 
employment practice was sex discrimination because 
men in the comprehensive disability program did not 
get the same treatment as women for involuntary or 
voluntary medical procedures.36
The PDA requires that pregnant employees receive 
equal treatment as other employees with respect to their 
benefits, and their ability to work.37 The plain language 
of the PDA defines discrimination “because of sex” or 
“on the basis of sex” to include discrimination based 
on pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related medical 
condition.38 The statute also directly covers the receipt 
of benefits under a fringe benefit program.39
At the time Congress enacted the PDA, over eighty 
million women were working to support their children. 
The employment practice upheld in Gilbert would 
have had a devastating effect on families.40 Therefore, 
Congress enacted the PDA to repudiate the Gilbert 
decision, and prohibit employment decisions on the 
basis of pregnancy.41
C. The Bona Fide Seniority System Exception Under 
Title VII Section 703(h)
Congress exempted bona fide seniority systems from 
Title VII and the PDA if the discriminatory effect 
is facially neutral.42 A bona fide seniority system 
determines an employee’s compensation, conditions 
or privileges of employment by the quantity or quality 
of production without intentionally discriminating 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.43 
Under Section 703(h) of Title VII, a seniority system is 
facially neutral if it unintentionally affects a protected 
group.44 Employers seeking exemption must also show 
that their policies are implemented in good faith.45
The Court has interpreted Section 703(h) to protect 
employers that have unintentionally extended the 
effect of past discrimination.46 In International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, Black and 
Hispanic employees brought a cause of action against 
their employer. Servicemen and city drivers, who were 
predominately Black and Hispanic, were paid less 
than line drivers, who were predominately White.47 
The city drivers or servicemen who transferred to line 
driver jobs started at the bottom of all line drivers, 
forfeited all of their competitive seniority.48 The Court 
ruled that this seniority system was bona fide and 
exempt from Title VII under Section 703(h) because 
the system applied equally to all races.49 Most of the 
city drivers and servicemen who were discouraged 
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from transferring to line driver jobs were White.50 Therefore, the seniority 
system was not a violation of Title VII, because there was no discriminatory 
intent.51
D. When a Violation Occurs Under Title VII
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, states that a Title VII violation occurs when a 
discriminatory seniority system actually deprives an employee of benefits.52 
In addition, President Obama signed recently signed the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act that states that an employer violates Title VII if its employee 
receives benefits that are based on discriminatory intent.53 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, states that a Title VII violation occurs when a discriminatory 
seniority system actually deprives an employee of benefits.54 The Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was a response to the Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. Inc55 decision that ruled that an unlawful employment practice 
occurs each time an individual is paid or receives benefits that are subject to 
a discriminatory compensation decision.56 Therefore, an employer violates 
Title VII when their employee receives benefits that are affected by a 
discriminatory decision.57
E.  Title VII Disparate-Impact Claims
The Supreme Court uses three tests to determine the legality of employment 
practices under Title VII.58
1. The Similarly Situated Rule: Any Benefit that Delivers Less to a 
Similarly  Situated Employee Is a Violation of Title VII
The Court developed the similarly situated rule in Bazemore v. Friday. 
According to this rule, a Title VII violation occurs every time an employee’s 
compensation is affected by discrimination, regardless of whether the 
pattern began prior to the effective date of Title VII.59 A Title VII violation 
occurs when similarly situated employees receive different pay. Liability 
may be imposed to the extent that the discrimination was perpetuated after 
the enactment of Title VII.60
The Ninth Circuit applied the Bazemore rule in Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 
holding that Pacific Bell’s pension benefits calculation violated Title VII.61 
In 1987, the aggrieved party was deemed ineligible for her company’s 
early retirement program, because she took pregnancy leave in 1972.62 
The retirement program was facially discriminatory because it denied early 
retirement to women on the sole basis that they took pregnancy-related 
leave prior to the PDA.63 The EEOC uses the fact pattern from Pallas as an 
example of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.64
2.  The Present Violation Rule: A Seniority System Is Facially Neutral When 
It Gives Present Effect to Past Discrimination 
The Supreme Court also evaluates Title VII disparate-impact claims using 
the present violation rule derived from United Airlines v. Evans.65 This 
rule ensures that employers are not found liable under Title VII for facially 
neutral actions that are merely present effects of past discrimination.66 In 
Evans, the Court held that the discriminatory effects of United Airlines’ 
seniority system were solely the result of past discrimination, therefore 
no present violation existed.67 The complaining party, worked as a flight 
attendant for United Airlines, which had a policy that flight attendants had 
to be unmarried females.68 The airline forced her to resign in 1968 after she 
got married, then rehired her in 1972 without giving her any credit for her 
prior service.69
The Court ruled that United Airlines’ policy was non-discriminatory for two 
reasons. First, the claim was based on present effects of past discrimination, 
because the claim was brought in 1977, based on discrimination that 
occurred in 1968 and was corrected in 1972. Second, the policy applied 
to employees equally.70 For these reasons, no Title VII violation had 
occurred.71
3. The Ledbetter Rule: Title VII Disparate-Impact Claims Must Show 
Unlawful  Employment Practice and Discriminatory Intent.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc. the Court introduced 
another rule to use when evaluating Title VII disparate impact claims. 
The Ledbetter Rule requires that a disparate-impact claim consist of an 
unlawful employment practice and discriminatory intent.72 In Ledbetter, 
the aggrieved party claimed that employer evaluated her poorly because 
of her gender, which resulted in lower pay then her male colleagues.73 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that a fresh violation takes place when an unlawful 
employment practice is committed with intentions to discriminate.74 A Title 
VII disparate-impact claim must include an unlawful employment practice 
and intentional discrimination.75
F. AT&T v. Hulteen
The Hulteen Court evaluated whether AT&T’s pension benefits calculation 
policy violated Title VII.76 The policy denied full pension benefits to 
employees who took pregnancy-related disability leave prior to the PDA. 
However, the policy gave full pension benefits to employees that took 
other temporary non-pregnancy-related disability leave.77 The Court held 
that AT&T’s pension benefits calculation was a bona fide seniority system 
that was facially neutral and exempt from liability under Section 703(h).78 
The PDA would have to be retroactive to find AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation discriminatory.79
1. Facts
The AT&T pension plan was inherited from its predecessor Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph’s (PT&T).80 The PT&T pension plan was based 
on a net credit system, which calculated benefits based on an employee’s 
period of service at the company minus his or her unaccredited leave.81 
Employees who took pregnancy leave received the maximum service credit 
for six weeks of leave, while those on disability leave earned full service 
credit for their entire periods of absence.82 PT&T adopted an Anticipated 
Disability Plan (ADP) that granted service credit for pregnancy-related 
disability leave on the same basis as leave taken for other temporary 
disabilities.83 When PT&T transferred its ownership to AT&T, AT&T 
retained its predecessor’s policy and made no adjustments to the ADP for 
the credit lost by employees that took pregnancy-related disability leave 
prior to the PDA.84
The aggrieved parties in this case took pregnancy-related disability leave 
before the PDA and did not receive credit for the leave taken over thirty 
days.85 The parties filed a complaint with the EEOC between 1994 and 
2002, and the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination finding reasonable 
cause to believe that AT&T discriminated against the respondents.86
2. En Banc Review
On en banc review, the Ninth Circuit held that based on the similarly 
situated rule in Bazemore and Pallas, AT&T’s pension benefits calculation 
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violated Title VII because it distinguished between 
similarly situated employees based on pregnancy.87 
AT&T violated Title VII because it excluded from 
the pension benefits calculation pregnancy-related 
disability leave lasting more than thirty days and taken 
prior to the PDA.88 Holding that AT&T’s policy was 
discriminatory was aligned with the Congressional 
intent behind the PDA.89
The court reasoned that the present violation rule 
in Evans did not apply because AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation was neither a past violation with 
present effect nor facially neutral.90 In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the respondents’ claim was a present 
violation of the PDA.91 Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, the complaining parties were harmed when their 
pregnancy-related disability leave taken prior to the 
PDA was excluded from the pension benefits policy.92 
AT&T’s pension benefits calculation was intentionally 
discriminatory and a present Title VII violation.93
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision
On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court overturned the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision by ruling that AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation was facially neutral and not a 
violation of Title VII.94 The Court held that the pension 
benefits in question were the current effects of AT&T’s 
net credit system, which was considered lawful prior 
to the enactment of the PDA.95 The similarly situated 
rule in Bazemore did not apply to this case.96 The 
Court distinguished Bazemore because Bazemore did 
not involve a seniority system and that discriminatory 
action occurred prior to enactment of the .97
The Supreme Court concluded that AT&T had a 
bona fide seniority system that is protected under 
Section 703(h), because it was not internationally 
discriminatory.98 The only way to conclude that 
Section 703(h) does not protect AT&T’s seniority 
system is to apply the PDA retroactively, which was 
not a clear Congressional intent.99
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision that AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation was intentionally discriminatory 
because it distinguished between the respondents 
and other similarly situated employees based on 
pregnancy.100 Justice Ginsberg reasoned that while the 
PDA does not require redress for past discrimination, 
it was enacted to end sex-based discrimination from 
and after 1978.101
iii. Analysis
A. The Supreme Court Erred in Ruling that AT&T’s 
Pension Benefits Calculation Was Facially Neutral and 
Exempt from Liability Under the Bona Fide Seniority 
System Exception
The Supreme Court wrongly held that AT&T’s pension 
benefits policy was exempt from liability under the 
bona fide seniority system exception. The policy 
violated Title VII because AT&T’s benefits calculation 
was intentionally discriminatory according to the plain 
text and Congressional intent of the PDA, as well as 
judicial precedent.102
1. AT&T’s Pension Benefits Policy Is Intentionally 
Discriminatory According to the Plain Reading of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and Thus Violates 
Title VII.
The Court incorrectly held that AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation was facially neutral. AT&T’s pension 
benefit calculation is intentionally discriminatory 
according to the plain text of the PDA.103 Because 
the effect of the pension calculation was to reduce 
benefits based on sex, the plain text of the policy was 
intentionally discriminatory.104 The PDA requires that 
the respondents be treated the same as other employees 
in their pension benefits, regardless of whether 
pregnancy-related disability leave was applied before 
the PDA.105 The act of calculating the respondents’ 
pension benefits is “based on” or “because of ” sex 
because AT&T deliberately chose to use the credit 
application of the pregnancy-related disability leave 
from prior to the enactment of the PDA to calculate the 
complaining parties’ pension benefits.106
AT&T’s pension benefits calculation was intentionally 
discriminatory because it violated the core principles 
of the PDA that require that employers treat “women 
affected by pregnancy” the same for all employment-
related purposes.107 The complaining parties were 
pregnant women affected by AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation because they were treated differently than 
other similarly situated employees who did not take 
pregnancy-related disability leave.108 AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation awarded lesser pension benefits to 
the individuals who took pregnancy-related disability 
leave before the PDA was enacted than it awarded 
to other similarly situated employees that took non-
pregnancy-related disability leave.109 Therefore, the 
Court incorrectly held that AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation was facially neutral because the calculation 
was intentionally discriminatory according to the plain 
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2. AT&T’s Pension Benefits Policy Is Intentionally 
Discriminatory According to the Congressional 
Intent of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and Thus 
Violates Title VII.
Additionally, the Court incorrectly held that AT&T’s 
pension benefits calculation was facially neutral 
because the calculation is intentionally discriminatory 
according to the congressional intent of the PDA.111 
Congress intended for the PDA to prohibit companies 
from reducing employees’ pension benefits because of 
pregnancy.112
Congress enacted the PDA to reestablish the principle 
of Title VII as it had been understood prior to the 
Gilbert decision.113 Gilbert upheld principles contrary 
to the EEOC interpretation guidelines on Title 
VII, which protected pregnant women from unjust 
employment discrimination.114 The legislative history 
of the PDA endorsed EEOC’s 1972 guidelines, that 
prohibited AT&T from reducing employees’ pension 
benefits based on pregnancy.115 The EEOC guidelines 
require an employer to calculate pension benefits and 
disability credit on the same terms for all employees.116
The PDA clarified that discrimination based on 
pregnancy and childbirth was sex discrimination 
and prohibited under Title VII.117 After the PDA, 
employment practices such as General Electric’s 
disability program, at issue in Gilbert, and AT&T’s 
pension benefits calculation are considered sex 
discrimination under Title VII.118Therefore, the 
Supreme Court incorrectly held that AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation was facially neutral because 
Congress intended for the PDA to require that pension 
benefits calculations provide the same benefits to all 
employees whether pregnant or not.119
3. AT&T’s Pension Benefits Calculation Is Intentionally 
Discriminatory According to the Bazemore Rule and 
Ledbetter Requirements, And Therefore Violates Title 
VII
Under Bazemore’s similarly situated rule, the Court 
incorrectly held that AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation was facially neutral. Similar to the 
seniority system in Bazemore, where Black employees 
were paid less than White employees for the same 
position, AT&T granted full pension benefits for 
retiring employees who took non-pregnancy related 
disability leave and only granted partial credit to 
employees who took pregnancy-related leave.120 
AT&T’s intent to discriminate was further evinced 
when it agreed to award full credit to one female 
employee that took pregnancy-related disability leave 
before the PDA, without changing the net credited 
system for all affected employees.121 Following 
Bazemore, courts have held, as in Pallas and Hulteen, 
that seniority systems awarding pensions disparately 
based on pregnancy are Title VII violations.122 AT&T’s 
pension benefits calculation is similar to the system 
in Pallas.123In Pallas, Pacific Bell’s new retirement 
program disqualified female employees because of 
pregnancy leave. Likewise, AT&T made no adjustments 
to PT&T’s net credit system causing employees that 
took pregnancy-related disability leave before the 
enactment of the PDA to suffer smaller pensions.124 
The previous analysis demonstrating that AT&T’s 
employment practice violated the Bazemore rule also 
demonstrates that the practice violates the Ledbetter 
standard for disparate-impact claims.125 The Court 
wrongly held that AT&T’s pension benefits calculation 
was facially neutral because AT&T’s pension benefits 
calculation is intentionally discriminatory according 
to Bazemore’s similarly situated rule and Ledbetter’s 
disparate–impact claim requirements.126
4. AT&T’s Pension Benefits Calculation Does Not 
Qualify for the Bona Fide  Seniority System Exception 
in Teamster and Section 703(h), and Thus Violates Title 
VII.
The Court erred in applying Teamsters and the 
Section 703(h) exemption to AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation.127 Unlike the seniority system 
in Teamsters that applied to all races equally, AT&T’s 
seniority system did not apply to all employees 
equally.128 Here, the complaining parties had sufficient 
evidence that the differential treatment resulting from 
AT&T’s pension benefits calculation was rooted in 
discriminatory intent.129 The Supreme Court erred in 
applying Teamsters and the Section 703(h) exemption, 
and therefore AT&T violated Title VII.130
B. The Court Erred in Holding that the PDA Would 
Have to Be Retroactive For It To Apply to AT&T’s 
Pension Benefits Calculation
The PDA would not require a retroactive effect for it 
to apply to the AT&T case for two reasons.131 First, 
the Evans present violation rule does not apply to this 
case. Second, AT&T’s pension benefits calculation is a 
present violation according to the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
1. Evans’ Present Violation Rule Does Not Apply to 
AT&T’s Pension Benefits Calculation Because the 
Calculation Is a Present Title VII Violation
AT&T’s discriminatory act is different from the 
United Airlines’ seniority system in Evans.132 Unlike 
Evans, AT&T’s discriminatory act was a new Title VII 
violation because it distinguished between similarly 
situated employees.133 Evans’ present violation 
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rule does not apply to this case because the AT&T 
employees were affected by both a decision to apply 
only thirty days of credit for their pregnancy-related 
disability leave, and the calculations of their pension 
benefits.134
This case is not a present violation because 
AT&T’s policy was not a violation continuing from 
prior to the enactment of the PDA. Each pension 
benefits calculation for each aggrieved party was a 
discriminatory compensation decision and a separate 
Title VII violation.135 Therefore, the PDA would not 
have to be applied retroactively for AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation to constitute a present Title VII 
violation.136
2. AT&T’s Pension Benefits Calculation Is a Present 
Violation According to the  Civil Rights Act of 1991 
and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Because the 
Employees Were Harmed When They Received Smaller 
Pension Benefits Based on Pregnancy Discrimination.
According to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the PDA would not have to be 
applied retroactively for a Title VII violation because 
employees were harmed by the deprivation of benefits 
when they received smaller pension benefits based on 
pregnancy discrimination.137 Both statutes allowed 
the complaining party to file a claim with the EEOC 
within 180 days of AT&T awarding reduced benefits 
based on pregnancy.138
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the employees were harmed 
because they received reduced benefits.139 Therefore, 
the respondents had the right under Title VII to file 
a charge with the EEOC each time they received 
a pension benefit based on pregnancy status.140 In 
conclusion, the Supreme Court erred in holding 
that the PDA would have to be retroactive for the 
respondents to recover.141
C. The Court Should Have Given Deference to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
Endorsement of the Pallas Decision
The EEOC’s endorsement of the Pallas decision was 
entitled to deference by the Court.142 If the Court 
had heeded the EEOC interpretation, it would have 
held that AT&T must allow women who were on 
pregnancy-related disability leave to accrue seniority 
in the same way as those who were on leave for reasons 
unrelated to pregnancy.143 The EEOC deserved “great 
deference” in this case, similar to the level of deference 
in Phillips and Griggs.144
EEOC is charged with administering Title VII.145 
Section 713(a) of Title VII grants the EEOC the power 
to issue regulations on Title VII.146 Furthermore, 
Congress gave the EEOC authority to issue regulations 
defining unlawful employment practices under Title 
VII. Therefore, the Court should have given deference 
to any reasonable interpretation of the Title VII by the 
EEOC.147
The Court should have given the EEOC guidelines 
“great deference” in determining a Title VII violation 
as it did in Griggs, because the EEOC’s endorsement 
of the Pallas decision supports the principles of the 
Civil Rights Act and contains valid reasoning.148 The 
factual similarities between Hulteen and Pallas make 
the EEOC’s endorsement well-reasoned.149
The EEOC’s endorsement of the Pallas decision 
supports the principles of the Civil Rights Act because 
it required that women that are affected by pregnancy 
are treated the same as their colleagues who are not 
or cannot become pregnant.150 Furthermore, the 
Pallas decision followed the principles of the PDA in 
clarifying that discrimination based on pregnancy and 
childbirth was sex discrimination and prohibited under 
Title VII.151 Therefore, the Supreme Court should have 
given the EEOC great deference.152
iV. Policy recommendation
A. Congress Should Decrease Employees’ Burden 
of Proof of Intent to Discriminate  in Fringe Benefit 
Discrimination Cases
The Court’s decision in AT&T v. Hulteen is a setback 
in the fight for women’s equality and will result in 
smaller pension and retirement benefits for women.153 
Congress must respond to the Court’s decision, as it did 
in Gilbert, to protect these women from discriminatory 
employment practices.154 Congress should amend 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act by decreasing the 
burden on employees to prove an employer’s intent to 
discriminate.155
While the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act made it easier 
for employees to win Title VII disparate-impact claims, 
employees still have a hefty burden of proof.156 It is 
very difficult for an employee to prove the employer’s 
intent to discriminate, especially when the practice 
originated years ago.157 Congress should include 
clarifying language that an employee can prove a 
“discriminatory compensation decision” by showing 
that she is a member of the protected class and was 
treated differently than a similarly situated person.158
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V. Conclusion
The Court holding in AT&T v. Hulteen was erroneous because AT&T’s 
pension benefits calculation was intentionally discriminatory, a present Title 
VII violation, and failed to give the EEOC deference.159 AT&T’s pension 
benefits calculation should not have been allowed to prevail as a bona fide 
seniority system.160 This decision penalizes women for taking pregnancy-
related disability leave in their earlier careers, and creates another obstacle 
in work place equality.161
Congress should respond to this decision by amending the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act to decrease the burden on employees proving employer’s intent 
to discriminate in fringe benefit discrimination.162 Congress’ response will 
prevent unfair treatment of retirement mothers.163
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EEOC Comp. Man. § 3-V.III(B)(Oct. 3, 2000) (requiring that employers 
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decreasing the employee’s burden in proving intent to discrimination will 
satisfy the necessity of demonstrating the existence of an “intentionally” 
discriminatory decision).
163  See Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. at 1980 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
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blessed-plan” for the rest of their lives).
